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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael D. Pulsifer appeals from the judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine entered upon his guilty plea, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation before taking his plea.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A patrol officer watched as Pulsifer, driving a Ford Bronco, parked in front of an
apartment complex. (R., pp.9-10.) A man approached the passenger side of the car
from the apartments, stood next to the window for about 20 seconds, and then returned
to the apartments. (R., p.10.) The officer ran the license plates for the Bronco and they
returned for a Mitsubishi Gallant. (ld.) The officer pulled over the Bronco and, during
the course of his brief detention, asked Pulsifer and his passenger if there was anything
inside the vehicle that he should know about before he deployed his canine. (Id.) The
passenger immediately pointed out a pipe and told the officer that Pulsifer had also
hidden a box as they were being pulled over. (ld.) The officer located the box, which
contained

a

clear

glass

pipe,

a

beaker,

and

a

plastic

baggie

of crystal

methamphetamine. (Id.) Continuing his search, the officer also found loaded syringes,
a small digital scale, packaging materials, several cotton swabs, a small torch, and
other instruments associated with the drug trade. (R., p.11.)
The state charged Pulsifer with possession of methamphetamine with the intent
to deliver. (R., pp.49-50.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state reduced the charge
to simple possession of methamphetamine and Pulsifer pled guilty. (Tr., p.8, Ls.11-14;
R., pp.58, 74-75.) After a probing plea colloquy, the district court accepted Pulsifer's
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guilty plea and ordered a presentence report with a substance abuse evaluation. (Tr.,
p.9, L.13-p.10, L.2; R, pp.70-71.)
During a pre-sentencing hearing, defense counsel conveyed concerns to the
district court from Pulsifer's friends and family members regarding head injuries he had
suffered in a prior car accident and requested a mental health evaluation. (Tr., p.12,
L.21 - p.13, L.13.) The district court ordered the mental health evaluation. (R, p.124.)
The case proceeded to sentencing where the district court entered judgment against
Pulsifer and imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed.
pp.141-44.) Pulsifer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.151-53.)
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(R,

ISSUES
Pulsifer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the failure to order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a
hearing to determine Mr. Pulsifer's competence to plead guilty and be
sentenced violate the state and federal constitutional rights to due process
as well as I.C. §§ 18-210 - 18-212? U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho
Const. Art. I, § 13.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Pulsifer failed to establish that the district court committed fundamental error
by not sua sponte ordering an evaluation of Pulsifer's competency to plead guilty?

3

ARGUMENT
Pulsifer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Committed Fundamental Error,
By Not Sua Sponte Ordering An Evaluation To Determine His Competency To Plead
Guilty
A.

Introduction
Pulsifer argues that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a

psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to plead guilty. (Appellant's brief,
pp.5-9.) He contends that there was evidence before the district court which should
have raised a genuine doubt about his competency and, as such, the failure to order an
evaluation violated his due process rights and I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. (ld.) This
argument fails. Pulsifer did not request a competency evaluation and, contrary to his
assertions, the record is devoid of any evidence that would have raised a bona fide
doubt about his mental capacity either to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his own defense, such that the district court would have been required to order
a competency evaluation on its own motion. Pulsifer has failed to establish fundamental
error or a violation of his due process rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an

alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227,
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "The decision whether reasonable grounds exist to order a
psychiatric evaluation and to conduct a hearing to determine a defendant's competence
to stand trial 1 is left to the trial court's discretion." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 777,

The competency standard for pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard
for proceeding to trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993).
1
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229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822, 992
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 969, 712 P.2d 668,
670 (Ct. App. 1985)).

C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence Before The Trial Court To Raise A Bona Fide
Doubt About Pulsifer's Competency To Stand Trial
To establish fundamental error, Pulsifer is required to show on the record a clear

violation of an unwaived constitutional right which prejudiced him. Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980.

Pulsifer argues that his unwaived constitutional right to due

process was violated by the district court's not sua sponte ordering a competency
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.) Pulsifer has failed to show any violation of his
due process rights and has therefore failed to establish fundamental error.
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not mentally
competent to stand trial.

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70 (2008); Drope v.

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966);
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287 (2003). To safeguard this right,
Idaho statutory law requires a trial court to order a psychological evaluation when there
is a genuine reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in his own defense
or understand the proceedings. I. C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211.
A defendant's fitness to proceed to trial is determined by the trial judge, who has
a "continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability to understand the proceedings
against him." State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822, 992 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App.
1999) (citing State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967,969,712 P.2d 668,670 (Ct. App. 1985));
see also I.C. § 18-212. However, "[a] trial court has no duty to independently inquire as
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to the competency of a defendant unless the defendant raises the issue by motion or by
presenting evidence showing lack of competency." State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761,764,
69 P.3d 181,184 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341,346,597 P.2d
227, 232 (1979)). When the issue of competency has not been explicitly raised, the trial
court must sua sponte inquire as to the defendant's competency only if the evidence
before it raises a bona fide doubt as to the competence of the defendant. Pate, 383
U.S. at 385; Fuchs, 100 Idaho at 346-47,597 P.2d at 232-33; Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764,
69 P.3d at 184.
The test for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial is whether he
"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding
of the proceedings against him." Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287 (citing
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); accord I.C. § 18-210 (prohibiting the
prosecution of any "person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense").

Thus, to

establish a due process violation, a defendant claiming for the first time on appeal that
the trial court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation must show from the record
as a whole that there was "substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine doubt"
concerning the defendant's ability to assist in his own defense and understand the
nature of the proceedings. See Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1977).
Therefore, to establish fundamental error in this case, Pulsifer is required to show that
there was substantial evidence on the record sufficient to raise a genuine doubt
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concerning his ability to assist his defense counsel and understand the nature of the
proceedings against him. Pulsifer has failed to carry this burden.
The United States Supreme Court has said, "[t]here are ... no fixed or immutable
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to
proceed .... " Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. "[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior,
his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all
relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required."

kl

Other relevant factors

include trial counsel's perceptions of the defendant's competence, the defendant's
communications with the district court, and the defendant's ability to use legal terms
appropriately. See Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764-65, 69 P.3d at 184-85; United States v.
Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2009); Williams
606 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
United States

V.

V.

V.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 567,

Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233 (2nd Cir. 2002);

Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1993).

Examining the record as a whole, there is no indication that Pulsifer was unable
to assist his defense counselor understand the nature of the proceedings against him.
The state notes that Pulsifer apparently answered "yes" initially to question 12 on his
Guilty Plea Advisory Form,2 which asks, "Do you claim that you are mentally incapable
of understanding these proceedings or what it means to plead guilty to a crime?" (R.,
p.60.)

The district court, recognizing the potential issue this presented, specifically

addressed that answer with Pulsifer as follows:

2 It appears from the face of the form that Pulsifer also answered "No" to question 12,
though that may have occurred as a consequence of his subsequent discussion with the
district court. (See R., p.60; compare with Tr., p.7, Ls.10-19.)
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THE COURT: Question 12 says, "Do you claim that you are
mentally incapable of understanding these proceedings or what it means
to plead guilty to a crime?" You circled the answer yes. Is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: That's not correct.
THE COURT: Should the answer be no?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You understand what we're doing here today, don't
you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.10-19.) Pulsifer unambiguously asserted that he understood the nature of
the proceedings against him; the district court did not commit fundamental error by
accepting Pulsifer's unambiguous assertion that he understood the proceedings.
Likewise, the record is replete with examples of Pulsifer participating in the
proceedings and assisting his defense counsel.

Pulsifer participated in the plea

negotiations and understood his agreement with the state. (R., pp.58, 66-67; Tr., pA,
L.17 - p.5, L.3.) Pulsifer discussed his post plea rights with his attorney. (R., p.68.)
Pulsifer actively participated in the plea colloquy, directly and coherently answering all
of the court's questions. (See Tr., ppA-10.) Pulsifer's defense counsel, who was in the
best position to evaluate Pulsifer's ability to understand the proceedings and assist in
his own defense, never expressed any concerns regarding Pulsifer's competence to
plead guilty; rather, defense counsel noted that Pulsifer's plea was made with counsel's
advice and consent. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-17.) Pulsifer was able to go over the presentence
investigation report with his attorney and asserted several corrections to that report
which were subsequently presented to the district court during sentencing. (Tr., p.21,
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LA - p.26, LA.) Pulsifer spoke at length with his attorney about the recommendations
counsel would present at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.10.) Pulsifer
also addressed the district court directly and coherently at sentencing. (Tr., p.31, L.7 p.34, L.13.) The record shows no substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
doubt concerning Pulsifer's ability to both understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and assist in his own defense.
Notwithstanding the clear evidence from the record demonstrating Pulsifer's
competence, he argues on appeal that other evidence, such as concerns from family
and friends regarding a head injury, his counsel's request for a mental health
evaluation, statements from the mental health evaluator, Pulsifer's missing an
appointment with his attorney, his improperly filling-out the answer sheet for his GAIN
assessment, and his statements at the sentencing hearing, all suggested competency
issues and so the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, p.B.) Pulsifer'S claims do not withstand scrutiny.
During a pre-sentencing hearing held more than two months after Pulsifer
entered his guilty plea, defense counsel conveyed to the district court concerns from
Pulsifer's friends and family regarding head injuries Pulsifer had suffered in a car
accident and requested a mental health evaluation to "determine the extent of any
impairment that may have happened and whether he is in need of any current mental
health treatment." (Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.13.) The district court ordered the mental
health evaluation. (R., p.124.) The mental health evaluator obseNed that Pulsifer did
not have any functional deficits due to mental health, that his thought processes "were
logical with light associations," and that "[h]e was oriented to person, place, time and
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purpose." (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, pp.3-8 (appended to PSI).) The
evaluator found that Pulsifer did not need any mental health treatment, but that he had
issues with substance dependency. (Id., p.9) While the mental health evaluator stated
that Pulsifer "does not appear to understand the terms of his plea agreement" (id.),
there was no indication that this was due to a lack of competence as opposed to a
miscommunication with counselor post-hoc attempts to get out of his plea.

This

evidence does not raise a genuine doubt concerning Pulsifer's ability to both understand
the nature of the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense.
The rest of Pulsifer's claims arise from the sentencing hearing. Pulsifer failed to
go over the presentencing report prior to the hearing.

(Tr., p.17, L.10 - p.18, L.2.)

Apparently frustrated by the defense's lack of preparation, the district court still
postponed sentencing so Pulsifer could go over the report with his counsel. (Tr., p.19,
Ls.12-20.) When Pulsifer was given the opportunity to address the court, he explained
that he missed the final appointment with his attorney, where they planned to review the
presentence report, due to a scheduling miscommunication.

(Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32,

L.16.) Nothing in that exchange creates a bona fide doubt as to Pulsifer's competence.
Second, in an effort to explain away "issues on the GAIN Assessment," defense counsel
noted that Pulsifer thought he might have "filled in the wrong dots" and so provided
inaccurate answers. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-16.) Nothing in the record explains what those
inaccuracies were, nor did defense counselor Pulsifer ever equate his possibly filling-in
the wrong dots with a potential competency issue. Finally, as noted above, just as he
had coherently addressed the court during his plea colloquy, Pulsifer coherently
addressed the court during his sentencing colloquy. (See Tr., p.31, L.8 - p.34, L.13.)
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Nothing in the record creates a genuine doubt as to Pulsifer's ability to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him or assist in his own defense.
Pulsifer has therefore failed to establish fundamental error in the district court's not sua
sponte ordering a competency evaluation. The judgment of the district court should be

affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Pulsifer's conviction and
sentence for possession of methamphetamine.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2012.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of June, 2012, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &
Bartlett, LLP
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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